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Abstract. In last decades there have been many proposals from the machine 
learning community in the intrusion detection field. One of the main problems 
that Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) - mainly anomaly-based ones - have to 
face are those attacks not previously seen (zero-day attacks). This paper pro-
poses a mutation technique to test and evaluate the performance of several clas-
sifier ensembles incorporated to network-based IDSs when tackling the task of 
recognizing such attacks. The technique applies mutant operators that randomly 
modifies the features of the captured packets to generate situations that other-
wise could not be provided to learning IDSs. As an application example of the 
proposed testing model, it has been specially applied to the identification of 
network scans and related mutations.  
Keywords: Network Intrusion Detection, Computational Intelligence, Machine 
Learning, IDS Performance, Classifiers. 
1 Introduction 
One of the most harmful issues of attacks and intrusions, which increases the difficul-
ty of protecting computer systems, is the ever-changing nature of attack technologies 
and strategies. 
For that reason, among others, IDSs [1], [2], [3] have become an essential asset in 
addition to the computer security infrastructure of most organizations. In the context 
of computer networks, an IDS can roughly be defined as a tool designed to detect 
suspicious patterns that may be related to a network or system attack. Intrusion Detec-
tion (ID) is therefore a field that focuses on the identification of attempted or ongoing 
attacks on a computer system (Host IDS - HIDS) or network (Network IDS - NIDS). 
 
ID has been approached from several different points of view up to now; many dif-
ferent Computational Intelligence techniques - such as Genetic Programming [4], 
Data Mining [5], [6], [7], Expert Systems [8], Fuzzy Logic [9], or Neural Networks 
[10], [11], [12] among others - together with statistical [13] and signature verification 
[14] techniques have been applied mainly to perform a 2-class classification (nor-
mal/anomalous or intrusive/non-intrusive). 
IDS evaluation is not a clear cut task [15]. Previous works have presented several 
techniques to test and evaluate misuse detection models for network-based IDSs. A 
testing technique to prove the effectiveness and capability of any visualization-based 
IDS employing numerical data to confront unknown attacks has been previously pro-
posed [16], [17]. In this case, the method is used to asses different classifiers in the 
detection of mutated network scans. The ability to detect such scans can help to iden-
tify wider and potentially more dangerous threats to a network. The main advantage 
of this testing model is that it provides the classifiers with brand new attacks - net-
work scans in this case -. 
A port scan may be defined as series of messages sent to different port numbers to 
gain information on their activity status. These messages can be sent by an external 
agent attempting to access a host to find out more about the network services this host 
is providing. A port scan provides information on where to probe for weaknesses, for 
which reason scanning generally precedes any further intrusive activity. This work 
focuses on the identification of network scans, in which the same port is the target for 
a number of computers. A network scan is one of the most common techniques used 
to identify services that might then be accessed without permission [18]. 
The remaining sections of this study are structured as follows: section 2 introduces 
the proposed testing technique. While the applied classifiers are described in section 
3, experimental results are presented in section 4. The conclusions of this study are 
discussed in section 5, as well as future work. 
2 A Mutation Testing Technique for IDSs 
Testing an ID tool is the only way to establish its effectiveness. This paper focuses on 
checking the performance of IDSs when confronting with unknown anomalous situa-
tions. 
Misuse IDSs based on signatures rely on models of known attacks. The effective-
ness of these IDSs depends on the "goodness" of their models. This is to say, if a 
model of an attack does not cover all the possible modifications, the performance of 
the IDS will be greatly impaired. 
The proposed mutation testing model was previously applied to a visualization-
based IDS [16], [17] and is based on mutating attack traffic. In general, a mutation 
can be defined as a random change. In keeping with this idea, the testing model modi-
fies different features of the numerical information extracted from the packet headers.  
The modifications created by this model may involve changes in aspects such as: 
attack length (amount of time that each attack lasts), packet density (number of pack-
ets per time unit), attack density (number of attacks per time unit) and time intervals 
between attacks. The mutations can also concern both source and destination ports, 
 
varying between the different three ranges of TCP/UDP port numbers: well known 
(from 0 to 1023), registered (from 1024 to 49151) and dynamic and/or private (from 
49152 to 65535). 
Time is another fascinating issue of great importance when considering intrusions 
since the chance of detecting an attack increases in relation to the duration of it. There 
are therefore two main strategies:  
 Drastically reduce the time used to perform a scan. 
 Spread the packets out over time, which is to say, reduce the number of packets 
sent per time unit that are likely to slip by unnoticed. 
In this study, the mutations are applied to data related to network scans. It should 
be taken into account and will be explained further on that any of the possible muta-
tions may be meaningless such as a sweep of less than 5 hosts in the case of a network 
scan. 
Changes can be made to the traffic related to attacks to take the following issues 
into account: 
 Number of scans in the scan (that is, number of addressed ports). 
 Destination port numbers at which scans are aimed. 
 Time intervals when scans are performed. 
 Number of packets (density) forming the scans (number of scanned hosts). 
3  Classifiers and Ensembles 
As previously explained, one of the most interesting features of IDSs would be their 
capability to automatically detect whether a portion of the traffic circulating the net-
work is an attack or normal traffic. Automated learning techniques are algorithms 
designed specifically for the purpose of deciding about new presented data. 
Usually that kind of algorithms suffer from common problems, such as the over-
fitting to the data used for training - and therefore, poor generalization capabilities -, 
the stuck on local minima in their learning function or a high computational com-
plexity when dealing with complex data. One of the most widespread and useful tech-
niques in order to avoid such problems is the ensemble learning scheme [19], [20]. 
The main idea behind this kind of meta-algorithms is to train several slightly different 
simpler classifiers and combine their results in order to improve the results obtained 
by a single, usually more complex, one [21]. 
In the present study several of these algorithms have been considered both for the 
base classifiers and for the ensemble training in order to have a significant wide array 
of possible algorithms to compare their performance results on mutated data sets.  
Among the base classifiers, it should be mentioned clustering algorithms such as 
the k-Nearest Neighbours (IBK) [22], instance-based statistical classification algo-
rithms such as the Simple Classification and Regression Decision Tree (CART) [23] 
and the REP-Tree [24] and artificial neural-network such as the Radial Basis Function 
Network [25]. 
Among the ensemble meta-algorithms that make use of the previous mentioned 
simple algorithms, the test performed have made use of basic algorithms such as the 
MultiClass Classifier [26], used to adapt binary classifiers to multi-class problems, 
 
Bagging [27], Adaptative Boosting (AdaBoost) [28], or Random Forest [29] and 
compared their results with more modern boosting algorithms such as the LogitBoost 
[30] or the  StackingC [31]. As results prove, ensemble learning adds an important 
value to the analysis, as almost all variants consistently improve results obtained by 
the single classifier. 
4  Experimental Results 
This section describes the datasets used for evaluating the proposed testing method 
and how they were generated. Then, the obtained results are also detailed. 
4.1   Datasets 
Real-life datasets have been previously applied to perform ID [16], [17], been proved 
that this low-dimensional datasets allow for the detection of some anomalous situa-
tions [11]. Packets travelling along the network are characterized by using a set of 
features extracted from the packet headers contribute to build up the neural-network 
input vector, x 5; these features can be listed as follows:  
 Timestamp: the time when the packet was sent. 
 Source port: the port number of the device that sent the packet.  
 Destination port: the port number of the target host, i.e. the host to which the pack-
et is sent. 
 Protocol ID: an integer number that identifies the protocol over TCP of the packet.  
 Size: the packet size (in Bytes). 
From these datasets, one of them was selected as the original one that was later mu-
tated. It contained examples of two different attacks: 
 Three different network scans aimed at port numbers 161, 162 and 3750. A time 
difference between the first and the last packet included in each sweep of 17 866 
ms for port number 161, 22773 ms for port number 162 and 17755 ms for port 
number 3750. 
 An MIB (Management Information Base) information transfer event. This anoma-
lous situation and its potential risks are fully described in [17], [32]. 
On the basis of this original dataset, several mutations were generated according to 
the testing technique previously described.  
Several testing data sets containing the following key features were obtained by 
mutating different characteristics of the original data: 
 Case 1 (modifying both the amount of scans and the destination ports): 
 Data set 1.- only one scan: port 3750. 
 Data set 2.- two scans: ports 161 and 162. 
 Data set 3.- only one scan: port 1734. 
 Data set 4.- two scans: ports 4427 and 4439. 
 Case 2 (modifying both time and the number of scans): 
 Data set 5.- three time-expanded scans: ports 161, 162 and 3750. 
 Data set 6.- three time-contracted scans: ports 161, 162 and 3750. 
 
 Data set 7.- one time-expanded scan: port 3750. 
 Case 3 (modifying both the amount of packets and the destination ports): 
 Data set 8.- two 5-packet scans: ports 4427 and 4439. 
 Data set 9.- two 30-packet scans: ports 1434 and 65788. 
The first issue to consider is the amount of scans. Data sets containing 1 scan (Data 
sets 1, 3 and 7), 2 sweeps (Data sets 2, 4, 8 and 9) or 3 sweeps (Data sets 5 and 6) 
have been used. Each scan is aimed at a different port number. The implications are 
crystal clear; hackers can check the vulnerability of as many services/protocols as 
they want. 
A scan attempting to check port protocol/service can be aimed at any port number 
(from 0 to 65535). The data sets contain scans aimed at port numbers such as 161 and 
162 (well known ports assigned to Simple Network Management Protocol), 1434 
(registered port assigned to Microsoft-SQL-Monitor, the target of the 
W32.SQLExp.Worm), 3750 (registered port assigned to CBOS/IP ncapsalation), 4427 
and 4439 (registered ports, as yet unassigned) and 65,788 (dynamic or private port). 
In order to check the performance of the described ensembles in relation to the 
time-related strategies, data sets 5, 6 and 7 have been used. Data set 5 was obtained by 
spreading the packets contained in the three different scans (161, 162 and 3750) over 
the captured session. In this data set, there is a time difference of 247360 ms between 
the first (in the sweep aimed at port 161) and the last scan packet (in the scan aimed at 
port 3750). The duration of the captured session (all the packets contained in the data 
set) is 262198 ms, whereas in the original data set the scan lasts 164907 ms. In the 
case of data set 7, the same mutation has been performed but only for packets relating 
to the scan aimed at port 3750. On the other hand, the strategy of reducing the time 
was used to obtain data set 6. In this case, the time difference between the first and the 
last packet is about 109938 ms. 
Finally, the number of packets contained in each scan was also considered. In the 
case of a network scan, each packet means a different host targeted by the scan. Data 
sets 8 and 9 were designed in complying with this idea. Data set 8 contains low-
density scans given that they have been reduced to only 5 packets. It was decided that 
a scan aimed at less than 5 hosts should not constitute a network scan. On the other 
hand, data set 9 contains medium-density scans. In this case, each one of them has 
been extended to 30 packets.  
4.2   Results 
For the sake of brevity, experiments were conducted only on two of the data sets 
described above: data set 6 and 9. All the classifiers were trained on the original da-
taset, comprising an MIB information transfer and scans aimed at port numbers 161, 
162 and 3750. 
To check the performance of the classifier ensembles when confronting different 
numbers of classes, the data sets were labeled in a different way. Two different labels 
were assigned to packets in dataset 6, differentiating attacks from normal traffic. On 
the other hand, five different classes were defined for data set 9, namely: normal, 
scan#1, scan#2, scan#3 and MIB transfer. 
 
WEKA software [33] was used to train and classify the data sets, with various en-
sembles and classifiers. In the experimentation, cross validation is used with a value 
of 10 K-fold. Tables 1 and 2 show the training and validation/classification perfor-
mance of the applied models. 
Table 1. Results on data set 6 (two classes). 
Ensembles Classifier Correctly Classified Instances 
FilteredClassifier 
MLP, REPTree, PART, 
















RandomSubSpace  SImpleCart 
Training (99,9659%) 
Classification (100%) 
RotationForest REPTree and PART 
Training (99.983%) for both 
Classification (100%) for both 
AttributeSelectedClassifier SImpleCart 
Training (99,8636 %) 
Classification (100%) 
Bagging REPTree  
Training (99.9659%) 
Classification (100%) 
Table 2. Results on data set 9 (five classes). 
Ensembles Classifier Correctly Classified Instances 
FilteredClassifier 
MLP, REPTree, PART, 
id3, SMO 
Training (99,9489%) for MLP 
Training (99,8977%) for Reptree 
Training (99,9489%) for PART 
Training (99,9148%) for id3 
Training (99,9659%)  for SMO 
Classification for all of then 
(81,25%) with 12 errors in the 
3rd class 
 














RandomSubSpace  SImpleCart 
Training (99.983%) 
Classification (100%) 
RotationForest REPTree and PART 
Training (99,983%) for RepTree 
Classification(89,0625%) for 
Reptree with 7 errors in the 4th 
class 
 
Training (99,983%) for PART 
Classification (53,125%) for 






Bagging REPTree  
Training (99.983%) 
Classification (100%) 
From Tables 1 and 2, it can be concluded that classification models are able to car-
ry out the classification of the two data sets and get the right classification of more 
than 99.9% of the classes.  
Table 3 shows the characteristics and options of the chosen ensembles, together 
with their tuned values. 
Table 3. Selected options of the ensembles for experimental study. 
Ensembles Options 
FilteredClassifier Name of the filter “Discretize” 
Adaboost  
Number of boost iterations (10), seed for resampling (1), use 
resampling instead of reweighting (false), percentage of 
weight mass (100). 
MultiboostAB 
Number of boost iterations ((10), number of sub-
committees.(3), seed for resampling (1), use resampling in-
stead of reweighting (false), percentage of weight mass (100). 
RandomSubSpace 
Number of iterations (10), Size of each subSpace ( 0.5), seed 
for resampling (1). 
RotationForest 
Maximum size of a group (3), Minimum size of a group (3),  
number of iterations to be performed (10), number of groups 
(false), filter used “Principal Components”, percentage of 
instances to be removed (50), seed for resampling (1). 
AttributeSelectedClassifier 
Name of an attribute evaluator  (CfsSubsetEval), name of a 
search method (BestFirst). 
Bagging 
Size of each bag (100), compute out of bag error (False), 
number of bagging iterations (10), seed for resampling (1). 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has proposed a mutation testing model for classifiers ensembles perform-
ing ID on numerical traffic data sets. It is aimed at assessing the generalization capa-
bility of the applied classifiers when confronting with zero-day attacks. 
 
Experimental results show that the applied classifier ensembles properly deal with 
the analyzed data, containing mutated network scans. It can then be concluded that the 
applied models are able to properly detect new attacks related with previously unseen 
scans. 
Future work will be based on the mutation of some other attack situations and the 
broadening of considered classifiers and ensembles. 
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